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Abstract
In tliis paper we present an algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in a
noncooperative normal form N-person game. More generally, the algorithm can
be applicd for solving a nonlinear stationary point problem on a simplotope, being
the Cartesian product of several simplices. 'flte algorithrn solves the problem
by solving a sequence of linear stationary point problems. Eacl~ problem in the
sequence is solved in a finite number ofiterations. Although the overall convergence
cannot be proved, the method performs rather well. Computational results suggest
that this algarithm performs at least as good as simplicial algorithms do.
I~or the sp~,cial case of a bi-matrix garne (N -'l), the a.lgoritlun has an ap-
pealing game-theoretic interpretation. In that case, the problem is linear and the
algorithm always finds a solution. rurthermore, the equilibrium iound in a bi-
matrix game is perfect whcnever thc algorithm starts from a strategy vcctor at
which all actions are played with positive probability.
Keywords: noncooperative game, Nash equilibrium, stationary point.
'This research is part of the VF-program "Co-operation and Competition", which has been approved
by thc Ncthcrl:uids Minivtcry of I;ducation aud Scicnccs.1
1 Introduction
In this papcr wc prcxcnt an algorithm for computing a Nash eyuilibrium (NE) in a
noncooperative N-pcrson game in normal form. First we s}row that a Nash equilibrium
of such a game is a stationary point of a multilinear function on a simplotope, being the
Cartesian product of several unit simplices. The algorithm solves the stationary point
problem oí a continuous function on the simplotope and to find a Nash equilibrium it
roughly works as follows. It starts from an arbitrary strategy vector in the simplotope.
The multilinear function is linearized by taking the first-order Taylor expansion around
that starting vector and extending it over the whole strategy space. Then the algorithm
finds a stationary point on thc simplotope for that linear function. If that strategy
vector is a sufficient approximation of a Nash equilibrium for the original game, then
the algorithm stops. Else the whole procedure is repeated but then from the strategy
vector just found, and so on. This procedure is motivated by Mathiesen [1985a,b], [1987)
who solves a Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NLCP) by a sequence of Linear
Complementarity Problems (LCP's). In practice this method works quite satisfactory,
although global convergence is not guaranteed. Contrary to our method, his procedure
may even fail to solve a specific LCP (see Mathiesen [1985b]).
Aecause our method solves a Sequence of Linear Stationary Point Problems we often
refer to it as the SLSPP-algorithm. This SLSPP-algorithm is a generalization of the
method presented in van den Elzen and Talman (1991] for finding an NE in a bi-matrix
game. In that case the relevant function is linear and an exact solution is found.
The most well-known methods for finding an NE in an N-person game are the simpli-
cial algorithms. For an exposition and some computational results we refer to Doup and
Talman [1987]. At the end of this paper we compare the results obtained with the simpli-
cial methods and the results we obtained with the procedure discussed here. We remark
that ín some sensc the mct}rod sketched above works similar as a simplicial algorithm.
Such a nu~thocl fincls in cacli round an cxacL solution for a picccwisc lincar approximation
of the original function. Thus, then the function is linearized on each simplex of some
simplicial subdivision, whcreas here we take a lincar approxirnation on the whole set.
'I'he advantage of siniplicial algorithrns is Lhat their glob:rl convergence is guarantcr.d.
Iluwc~vcr, c,tipcxially in thc Ia.Lc,r ruunilti sinipliri:cl alguritlinis in:ry nc~ccl niurc itcrations
to rcach a solution. ln practicc it sccnis bc~t to combinc both mcthods by applying a
simplicial algorithm during the first rounds, and later on the method discussed here.
Concerning other methods we refer to the articles of Rosenmuller [1971] and Wilson2
[1971]. Ilowevcr, hoth art,icles are Lheoreticai of nature and of hardly any use for practi-
cal in,plcnu~ntatiun. Roscnn,tïllcr argucs that cach uondcgcncrated N-pcrson garne has
an od,l nuiul,rr uf i~ulatc,cl N.c.,l, cquilibria. 'I'hc masoning is si,nilar Lo Lhat in Lemkc and
Ilowson [1964] fur bi-n,atrix ganics; thcrc is a path cunnccting thc wnstructcd starting
vector and an NE whereas the other Nash equilibria are pairwise connected by paths.
However, he gives no procedure how to follow these paths. The latter is crucial because
these paths are in general not linear. WiLson (1971] proves the existence of a path leading
to an NE in an N-person game. This path finds in succession an equilibrium for each
uf a~rl,;cin ml.rtc~d k t,c~rsun ~;a,nc~, for k incrc,~,tiing fruni I Lu N. Au c~ynilibrium for thc
k-person game is tlien the starting point of a path leading to arr NE of a(k f 1)-person
game and so on. Ilowcvcr, also herc mcrely thc cxistcncc of thc path is proved and no
method is given to follow it.
We stress the fact that our method can be used for other problems then the problem
of finding a Nash equilibrium. In fact it can be used for finding a stationary point of an
arbitrary continuous function on a simplotope.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce sorne notation
and show that the set of Nash equilibria coincide with the solutiorr set to a stationary
point problem on a simplotope. Furthermore, we introduce the algorithm. Next, in
Section 3 we present the formal steps of the algorithm. Finally, in Section 4 we give a
game-theoretic interpretation of the algorithm and present an example. Furthermore, we
compare the períormance of the SLSPP-algorithm with that of the simplicial algorithms.
2 Nash equilibria as solutions to a stationary point
problem
We consider noncooperative games with a finite number of players each having a finite
set of actions. The payoffs to a player are listed in a tensor. Each element in the tensor
indicates the payoff to that player when a specific set of actions is played by the players.
Let us introduce some notation. The number of players equals N and the players are
indexed by j, j E{ I,... , N}. The set {1, ..., N} is often denoted as !N. Player j ha.g
n~ actions. Actiun k uf playcr j is indicatcd as (J,k). 'I'hc sct of actions of playcr j,
i.e. the set {(j,l),...,(j,n~)} is denoted by I(j). The set of all actions in the game is
often denoted by I, i.e. I- UJEiN I(j). The payoffs to player j are listed in a tensor
A', j E I~r. The payoff to player j in case each player i E IN plays action (i, e;) is
denoted bY A'(er, . . . , Q~-1i t?„ Q~tr, . . . , ~~r).3
A strategy of player j, j E IN, is represented by a vector xj -(xjr, ..., xj"~ )T
in S"~-' :- {xj E R~' ~~k'r xjk - 1}. The number xjk, k E {1, ..., nj}, is then the
probability with which player j plays his k-th action at strategy xj. Since the components
of xj are all nonnegative and sum up to one, xj is indeed a vector of probabilities. We
call S"~-' the strategy space of player j. 1n case actions are played with probability one
we speak about pure strategies. The strategy space of the game is then the simplotope
S obtained by taking the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces of the players, í.e.
S- S"''' x... x S""-r. An element x-(xr, ..., x~r) in S denotes a strategy vector of
the game with xj the strategy played by player j E 1~,.
The marginal expected payoff function z is a function from S to jjN r R"~ defined by
z(x) - (zr(x), . . . , zN(x)), with
n~ n~-, n~t~ nN
zjk(S) - ~ ... ~ ~ ... ~ IÍ~(Q1,...,eJ-~,
k,QJtle. ..,eN)~i~jxiL,,
[,-1 f~-,-1 f~i~ol fN-1
(J,k) E !(7),J E I~r.
Thus zjk(x) is the playoff to player j in case he plays his k-th pure strategy while each
othcr player i plays xi. Now a Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy vector at which
no playi~r c~an irnprovr~ upon his sitnat.ion by unilat,c~rally dr~vial.ing frorn his strategY.
'1'hus, x' -(x„..., x~,) E S is a Nash cquilibriurn i[
(x~ )zj(x`) G (x~)TZj(x`), xj E S"~-r, j E!N.
Thc numbcr (x~ )Tzj(x') cquals the expected payoff of playcr j E!N at the strategy
vector x'. Thus, at a Nash equilibrium x' it is optimal for each player j to play x~.
System (`l.l ) shows that x' solves the stationary point problcrn of the function z on S.
Indeed the set of Nash equilibria corresponds to the solution set of this stationary point
problem.
Because of the linearity of x~zj(x') in xj we only have to check (2.1) for the vertices
of S"~-r, i.e. for the pure strategies. Thus, x" is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
zjk(x') C(x~)TZj(x') for all (j,k) E I. From this it is straightforward to derive that x'
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
zjk(x') - inaXhzjh(x') WhCR x~k ~ 0, (~, k) E l. (2.2)4
In general we say that an action k of player j is optimal at strategy x when z~k(x) -
maxh z~~(x) and that at x player j is in equilibrium when at x all nonoptimal actions
of j are played with probability zero. The interpretation of (2.2) is that at a Nash
equilibrium the actions being played with positive probability are all optimal and hence
that all players are in equilibrium.
How does the algorithm work to find a strategy vector x' obeying (2.2)? First we
choose an arbitrary starting vector v-(vl, ..., vN) in S. Then we linearize z around v
to obtain the function zv : S -~ Rn, defined by
z~(x) - z(v) f Dz(v)(x - v), (2.3)
where n -~N 1 n~, and Dz(v) is the (n x n)-matrix of derivatives of z at v. More
precisely, the (p, q)-th element of Dz(v) equals bz~k(v)~ëx;h, where p-~1-1 nr ~ k and
q-~~-~ nr -F h. Observe that this element is zero ií (i,h) E 1(j). Note also that
z(v), x, and v are represented as vectors in Rn. Now we apply a generalized version
of the algorithm presented in van den Elzen and Talman [1991], to find an NE for
the game with marginal expected payoff function zv. If that strategy vector is a close
enough approximation of an NE for the original game then the algorithm stops. Else the
procedure is restarted from the strategy vector just found.
So, the algorithm searclres for an equilibrium for the game with marginal payoff
function z~. 1t does so by generating from v a path of strategy vectors x-(xl, ...,~N)
iu S obeying for (j, k) E l,
~jk - b(2, v)vjk lf z~k(2) G maXhZ~h(~)
2jk ~ b(2, v)Zljk l~ 2'jk12) - maX~Z~h(2),
where 0 C 6(x, v) :- min~~,h~{x~hw~h ~ v~h ) 0} C 1.
Observe that the strategy vector v obeys (2.4) witli b(x, v) - 1. Also any Nash
equilibrium x' for the game with marginal payoff function z" obeys (2.4) with b(x', v) - 0
or with v~k - 0 for all indices (j, k) for which z~~(x") c maxh z~h(x'). In both casesr~k -- b(r',v)v~k is cqual tu rcro whcu al, r' action (J,k) is nonoptinial. Undcr somc
uondegeneracy coudition the set of points satisfying (2.4) contains a piecewise linear
path, P, from v to a Nash equilibrium related to zv. 1'hat Nash equilibrium is an
approximation for a Nash equilibrium for thc original game. Thc path P will be followed
by the algorithm ati describc,cl in t.he next scci,ion.
'l'hc nutiun uf nonclegencracy will be made prccise further on, but it is for cxample
required that at x - v it rnust hold that maxh z~h(x), j E !N, is attained for a unique
index. Thus, at the starting strategy vector v each player has only one optimal action.
Suppose these maxima are attained for the actions (j, kj), j E IN. Clearly, from v, along
the path P,6(x, v) must decrease from 1. Thus, according to (2.4) initially vectors x
in S are generated such that all the x~k with k~ kj, j E IN, are relatively decreased
(x;~ - 6(x, v)v;~ for (i,e) ~{(j, kj), j E!N}), while every xjk~, j E IN, is increased to keep
xj in S"~-'. This is continued till either h(x, v) becomc~ 0 and a Nash equilibrium for x~ is
reached, or a strategy vector .r is reached at which z~k(x) - z~k~ (x) for some (j, k), k~ kj.
Then xjk is also relatively increased. In general, the algorithm generates strategy vectors
x such that all the xjk~vjk, related to the indices (j, k) foc which z~k(x) G maxh x~h(x), are
minimal, i.e. equal to b(x, v) (xjk - 0 if vjk - 0). As soon as one of these components of
zv(x), say z~l(x), becomes equal to maxh z~h(x), then xj~~vji is increased from b(x, v) (xj~
is increased from zero if vj~ - 0), while keeping x~r(x) maximal for j. On the other hand,
if a vector x is generated such that xj,~vj, for some (j, r) with z~r(x) - maXh x~h(x)
becomes minimal, i.e. equal to b(x, v) (xj, becomes 0 if vj,. - 0), then vectors y are
generated with yj,. equal to b(y, v)vj,. while z~,(y) is decreased from maxh z~h(y).
3 The procedure
The algorithm is a complementary pivoting procedure. To implement it we have to
write (2.4) as a system of linear equations. Observe that for each vector x satisfying
(2.4) there is at least one set T C ! with Tj - T fl !(j) ~~ for all j such that xjk ~ óvjk
and z~k(x) - ,(3j for all (j, k) E T whilc ~h(x) G ,Q; and x;h - Gv;h for all (i, h} ~ T, whcre
G- h(.r, r) ancl ~i~ n,ax~, ;~'~,(.r). hruin this ubticrval,ion wc obtain thaL thc proccdurc
gi~n~~raLc~s fur a sr~~u~~nr~~ uf suhscl,s ~l' uf l, starting Íron~ .r -- v, stratcgy vcctors x iu S,
such that




zv(x) - - ~ ~;he(i, h) f ~ Qjéj,
(i~h)QT j-1
with ~(j,k)ET, ~jk - 1-6 for j E I~,, ~jk ? 0 for (j, k) E T, ~r;h ? 0 for (i, h) ~ T, b E[0,1].
The vector e(j, k) denotes the (~;-i n;f k)-th unit vector in R" and éj denotes the vector
in R" with ones on the places ~1-1 n~ ~ k, k E { 1, ..., Taj }, and zeros elsewhere.
So, we obtain the linear system (3.1) from ( 2.4) by introducing slacks for each inequal-
ity. Next, we substitute the first system of equations in (3.1) into the second system and
together with (2.3) we obtain Lhe system of linear equations
bDz(v)v ~ ~ ~jkD'kZ(v) f ~ p;he(i, h) - ~ Qjéj - Dz(v)v - z(v) (3.2)
(j,k)ET (i,h)~T jE~~v
with 6~- ~ J~jk - 1, for j E IN.
(j,k) ET~
Ilere D~kz(v) denotes the (~;-i n; ~ k)-t6 column of thc rnatrix Uz(v).
We obtain the final system by substitutiug b' - 1-6 and for j E IN, ,~jk~ bY b~-~k~k, ~jk
where kj is the index for which zjk~ (v) - max~ zji(v). In this way, we obtain a system of
n equations with n f 1 variables. More precise, we get the system of equations
b'( ~ D'k~z(v) - Dz(v)v) -~ ~ .1jk(D'kz(V) - D'k~z(t'))
JE ~N ( ~.k)ET
k~k~
~ ~ (~ihL(2,h) - [~ h'jej - -zlv)i
(i,h)~T jE~r-7
with additional restrictions ajk ~ 0 for (j,k) E Tj`{(j,kj)},~k~k,~jk G 6' for j E
lN,O G b' G 1, and ~i;h ) 0 for (i,h) ~ T. Obscrvc that (3.3) is cquivalcnt to system




A solution to (3.3) is denoted as (b', a, ~„(~) with a-(.1;k)(;,k)ET, I~ -(~tk)(;,h)~T, and
Q-(Qr,...,~N). The algorithm is a complementary pivoting procedure operating in7
system (3.3), with the variables in a and ~ being complementary. So, ;f J~;k for some
(j, k) E 'l becomc~s zero then p;k is increased [rom zero and vice versa. To guarantee
convcrgence we necd that not more than one variable becomes zero at the same time.
Assumption 3.1 (Nondcgc-nc~racy Assuniption). At cach solution (G', ~, fc, ~3) of (3.3) at
most one of thc constraints 0 G G' G 1, ~~k 1 0 for (j, k) E Tr -'I'`{(j, k;), j E hr}, b' ~
~t;,k)ETj ~ik~ l~~h ? 0 for (i, h) ~ T, is bincíing, unlcss b' - 1 or v;h - 0 for all (i, h) ~ T.
The assumption above implies that at v each player should have only one optimal action.
If for example z;~(v) - z;k~(v) - Q; for some index e then two constraints would hold at
the start (b' - 0 and p;t - 0).
'I'hc~ furnia.l s1,c,ps uf I,hc, I~roi~c~durc~ arc Lhc, following.
Step 0 [Initialization]
Choose an arbitrary vector v in S. If v is a Nash equilibrium then the algorithm stops.
Else choose a measure of inaccuracy b, a maximum number of rounds t, and set t equal
to 1.
Step 1
[f t~ i then thc algorithm stops and no approximate Nash cquilibrium is found within t
rouncls. I?Isc construct Lhc (irst-ordcr 'I'aylor cxpausiun zu of z at v as in (Z.3). Calculatc
for j E IN the unique index (j, k;) for which z;k~(v) - maxh z;h(v). Furthermore, set
Tl - 0, 6' - 0, ~i; - z;k~ (v) for j E IN, p;n -(3; - z;h(v} for h ~ k; and i E IN. Increase
6' from 0 in (3.3) and go to Step 2.
Step 2
a. If 6' becomes 1 then let the solution of (3.3) be ( 1, ~',p', (í'). The vector x`,
with x' - ~l;,klET ~~ke(j, k) is a solution to the SPP of zv on S (cf. (2.2)). If
max~;,k~(z;k(x') -(x~)TZ;(x")) C b then x` is an approximate Nash equilibrium
and the algorithm stops after round t. Else t becomes t f 1 and return to Step 1
with v equal to x'.
b. If ~;k becomes 0 for some (j,k) E Tr then Tr becomes Tr`{(j,k)} and go to Step
3a.
c. If ~f;,klET~ ~ik becomes equal to b' for some j E IN then a;k~ becomes 0. Go to8
Step 36.
d. If p;h becomes zero for some (i, h) ~ T then go to Step 4.
Step 3
a. [ncrease the complenrentary variablc ti~k from zero by pivoting into system (3.3)
the column e(j, k). R.eturn to Step 2.
b. Substitute the largest ~~k, say .~~c, by b' -~ ~ h~ET~ ~Jh. Increase p~k~ from zero by
h~k~,[
pivoting thc relatcd column into systcrn (3.3). 7'r becomcs Tr`{(j, E)}, k~ becomes
f, and return to St,cp 2.
Step 4
a. If v~k - 0 for all (j, k) ~ T U{(i, h)} then let the solution be (b", .1`, ~', ~i'). The
vector x' -(1 - b'")v -{- ~t~,klET~~ke(j,k) is a solution to the SPP of xv on S
(cf. (2.2)). If maxt~,k~(z~k(x') -(x~)T x~(x")) G b then x' is an approximate Nash
equilibrium and the algorithm stops after round t. Else t becomes t-~ 1 and return
to Step 1 with v equal to x'.
b. Otherwise increase the complementary variable a;h from zero by pivoting its related
column into system (3.3). Tl becomes Tl U {(i, h)} and return to Step 2.
4 Game theoretic interpretation and computation
The procedure presented in Section 3 has an intuitive game-theoretic interpretation for
the game with marginal expected payoff function zv. In case N- 2 the funetion zv
corresponds with z and the interpretation is even more appealing.
The procedure starts by increasing the probabilities with which at v the optimal
actions are played whereas the probabilities related to the other actions are decreased
relatively cqually (b decrcases from 1 and .~~k~ increases from 0 for j E IN). With rel-
ativcly wc rncan rcla.tivc to Lhc initial proliabilitics. In gcncral thc algorithm gcncratcs
strategy vcctors at which the relative probabilitics rclatcd to the nonoptimal actions are
all equal and minimal whereas they are zero if the probability is initially zero. As soon
as a strategy vector is generated at which an action that was nonoptimal becomes opti-
mal (~t;~ becomes zero for sonic (i, P) ~'I') thcn that action is kcpt optimal whereas the
relate.d relative probability is allowcd to incrcase frorn thc rninimum (a;i is increased).
On thc othcr hand, if a vectur is gcncratcd at which Lhc probability rclated to an optimalaction I,ccunres rclativcly nriuinial ( 1~k I~ccurncs zcro (or sonrc (~, k) E 1') or zero if v~k
is zero, then the probability is kept relatively minimal (zero if v~k is zero) and the action
is made nonoptirnal (~c~A is incrc~~scd frorn zcro).
We illustrate the working of the algorithm by an example.
Example 4.1. We consider a noncooperative 3-person game, in which each player has










The left matrix entails the payoffs in case player 1 plays his first action, the right matrix
corresponds to strategy vectors at which player 1 plays his second action. Each entry in
the matrix consists of thrce clcments corresponding to the payoffs for each player. For
example, if player 1 plays (1,2), player 2 plays (2,2) and 3 plays (3,1) then player 1 and
2 get a payoff of 1 whereas player 3 gets -3.
Let us apply our algorithm starting from v-((1~2,1~2),(1~2,1~2),(1~2,1~2)). Lin-
earizing the marginal payoff function z at v gives
0 0 0 3 1.5 1.5
0 0 1 -2 1 -2
0.5 -3 0 0 0 -2.5
3 1 0 0 1 3
1 -0.5 0 0.5 0 0










At x- v,zv(x) equals z(v) and the optimal action for player 1 is (1,1), for player
2 action (2,2), for player 3 action (3,1). Thus, from the start the related probabilities
are increased by increasing 6' from zero (Step 1). After one step a stationary point10
for z~ is faund because b' becomes 1(Step 2a). !t is easily checked that the vector
x-(( l, 0), (0,1), ( I, 0)) is indeed a Nash equilibrium related to the marginal payoff
function zv. However, z(x) equals (2,1, 3,1, 4, -6)T, i.e. i is not a Nash equilibrium for
the original game because player 2 is not in equilibrium at i. In the second round we
linearizc z aL v- x and obtain
0 0 1 2 2 4
0 0 1 1 1-5
3 -3 0 0 3 -2
1 1 0 0 1 5
4 -3 -2 4 0 0
-6 -2 3 -6 0 0 x32
At the start we have that Ql - zll(v) - 2, ,Q~ - z21(v) - 3, and ,Q3 - x31(v) - 4.
Furthermore p12 - 1, I~22 - 2, and p32 - 10. Then 6' is increased from 0(Step 1).
If b' becomes 2~3 then ~e32 becomes 0 (Step 2d). For the solution to (3.3) it further
holds that (j -(Q1, Q2, Q3) -(4~3, 3, 0), ~12 - 1 ~3, ~22 - 2. Thus, now .132 is in-
creased (Step 4) till 2~9 when ~e22 becomes zero (Step 2d). For the solution to (3.3) we
have,0 -(16~9,17~9,0), p12 - 19~9, J~31 - 4~9, b' - 2~3 with corresponding vector
x' -((1, 0), (2~3, 1~3), (7~9, 2~9)). Since v~k - 0 for all (j, k) such that p~k ~ 0, x' is
an equilibrium for zv (Step 4a). It is easily verified that x' is also a Nash equilibrium
for the original game.
Finally we compare the speed of our algorithm with that of simplicial algorithms.
We applied our algorithm to the three games given in Doup and Talman [1987] and
compared the results with those given in Doup [1988, ch. 11]. Three different simplicial
algorithms are applied to the games. In Table 4.1 we compare our results with the best
results obtained by the simplicial algorithms. It turns out that our algorithm is at least
as good.11












Table 4.1. Computational results obtained for three noncooperative more-person games.
LP denotes the number of linear programming pivoting steps whereas v denotes the
number of rounds.
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